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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIANNE EVANS, , 
Appellant : 
: Case # 20000065-CA 
: Priority 2 i 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee : 
' ( 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT < 
Julianne Evans appeals from a decision entered by the Honorable Thomas Willmore of 
the First District Court of Utah, denying her Motion to Suppress. This court has jurisdiction over 
i 
the appeal of the court pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 78-2(a)-3(2)(e) Utah Code 
Annotated (Supp. 1999). 
< 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal is whether the consent allegedly given by appellant 
was voluntary, or coerced, when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. ^ 
Standard of Review 
A '"trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary is to be 
4 
< 
reviewed for correctness.' State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993). However, 'the 
trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous.' State v. Harmon 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)." State v. Archuleta 925 P.2d 
1275,1277 (Utah App. 1996). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section XIV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
On March 25,1999 , a Division of Child and Family Services caseworker went 
unannounced to the home of Julianne Evans to remove her newborn child on allegations of 
dependency, neglect or abuse of the child. Officer Crapse and Officer DeRyke of the Brigham 
City Police Department were dispatched to Ms. Evans' home on a keep the peace call (Record at 
94, page 2, lines 19-25)("R. at p.2,11.19-25"). Ms. Evans, though distraught and upset that her 
infant was being taken away from her, was cooperative with the caseworker of the Division of 
Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), and the officers. (R. at p.6,1.10). The officers noted that 
Ms. Evans was "in a distressed state." (R. at p. 19,1.6). The officers did not observe Ms. Evans 
to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (R. at p.6,11.14-15). While Ms. Evans was 
packing up baby formula and toys for the infant, Officer DeRyke asked Ms. Evans if they could 
"take a quick look around the house." (R. at p.7,11.2-4). Ms. Evans paused in her packing, and 
stated "I don't know what to say to you." (R. at p.7,11.9-10) Officer DeRyke asked, "does that 
5 
mean you have something here that you don't want us to find?" (R. at p.7,11.12-13). Ms. Evans 
remained silently packing her baby's belongings. (R. at p.7,11.15-16). Officer Crapse asked , 
again, "do you mind if we search the home." (R. at p.7,11.21-22). Ms. Evans, packing up the 
baby's belongings, shook her head no. (R. at p.7,1.24). Officer Crapse persisted, "is that no, you 
don't mind if we do that, or no, you don't want us to look around." (R. at p.8,11.5-6). Ms. 
Evans sat still and contemplated her response. (R. at p.8,11.10-11). Ms. Evans made no 
indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17). < 
Again, Officer DeRyke asked if they could search the home. (R. at p.28,11.9-10). Again, the 
Defendant remained silent, and did not indicate, verbally or otherwise, that the officers could 
search the home. (R. at p.9,11.1-3). Officer DeRyke further stated, "if you have drugs here look 
what its doing to your life, look what its doing to your family. It's ruining your life." (R. at p.29, 
11.17-19). Officer Crapse continued, "I'll tell you what, if you give me the drugs you have in the , 
house I promise not to take you to jail today." (R. at p.9,11.13-15). Officer Crapse had no 
intention of arresting Ms. Evans at that point. (R. at p.9,1.25 to R. at p. 10,1.1). Again, Ms. 
Evans merely contemplated the officers' statement, and made no indication of consent to a 
search. (R. at p. 10,1.13). Finally, Ms. Evans responded that she could not remember where she 
had any drugs. (R. at p. 11,11.4-5). Officer Crapse asked her to think of where she normally kept . 
her drugs and look for them there. (R. at p. 11,11.9-10). The DCFS worker added, " it would be 
best for you to give this officer what drugs you have so when you get sent to take a urinalysis it 
will come back as negative." (R. at p. 10,11.19). Ms. Evans subsequently went to her purse, and 
produced a small container with alleged controlled substance. (R. at p.l 1,11.14-17). 
Subsequently, Officer Crapse prepared a permission to search form which he had Ms. Evans 
6 
sign. (R. at p. 17,11.9-11). The officers searched her home, finding further evidence of alleged 
controlled substance. (R. at p. 14,11.20-21). 
Appellant, by and through her attorney of record, motioned to Suppress Evidence at a 
hearing held before the Court on August 10,1999. The Honorable Thomas L. Willmore entered 
a memorandum judgment on Appellant's Motion to Suppress on October 13,1999. (R. at 61-
64). Ms. Evans entered a conditional plea of guilty, and preserved her right to an appeal. 
Appellant was sentenced on a third degree felony on December 22,1999, and a judgment and 
order of probation was entered on December 22,1999. (R. at 78-79). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Probable cause can be difficult to pin down, and getting a warrant takes time. Rather than 
laboring under the state and federal prohibition against unreasonable searches, an officer can 
easily persuade a member of the public to give "consent." Confused and upset by an encounter 
with law enforcement, the average citizen easily agrees to a search of his or her person and 
property. 
However, a consent that is the product of duress and coercion is not consent. If the 
Fourth Amendment protection is to be upheld, a consent search must be given freely and 
intelligently, in an environment free of strong-arm tactics, even emotional pressuring. Finally, a 
police officer may not claim consent was given because the suspect never adamantly, explicitly, 
and consistently refused. Instead, the burden is on the State to overcome every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and to show that consent was 
validly obtained. 
7 
In the instant case, Ms. Evans, a young mother, finds herself in a personal crisis. DCFS 
shows up at her home to take away her newborn infant. DCFS is accompanied by two male
 ( 
officers, fully uniformed, carrying firearms. As she hurriedly packs the baby's belongings, and 
receives hasty instructions from DCFS, the two officers ask her repeatedly if they can search the 
home. Obviously distraught, Ms. Evans tells them she does not know how to respond to them, 
but they persist. In the course of obtaining "consent," the officers employ several techniques. 
They question her directly several times. When she says no, they attempt to "clarify." Finally, 
they try to work a deal: "produce contraband, and we will not take you to jail today" even though 
they have no cause to take her to jail at that time. The DCFS worker also implies that she will 
have a better opportunity to visit her infant if she produces contraband for the officers. 
The "consent" obtained by the Brigham City police officers was anything but. Ms. Evans 
only relented once she had been questioned several times, and threatened by incarceration. When 
viewed in the totality of the circumstances it is clear that Ms. Evans' consent was the product of 
coercion and duress, and was thus invalid. As such, evidence obtained against her is properly 
i 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
i 
I. Search Violated Ms. Evans' Rights Under the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated." According to the well established judicial doctrine, the right 
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion exists "whenever an individual may harbor 
8 
i 
a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S. Ct. At 1873 (quoting 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)(Harlan, J., 
concurring). The Fourth Amendment further requires that a search be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant based on probable cause. There are, however, several narrow exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, including but not limited to: a search incident to arrest, a search of an automobile 
based on probable cause because it contains contraband, and seizure of evidence in the plain 
view of one who is lawfully in the place from where the evidence is seen. State v. Hygh. 711 
P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1987). 
The Court determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts exist to establish 
the constitutionality of a search by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
case. Once the Defendant has raised the issue of an invalid search and seizure, the burden shifts 
to the State to prove that the search and seizure was valid, and that the circumstances of the 
seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 
762, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 
1984); State v. Sterger. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991)("Courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.") 
This Court has established an analytical framework for determining whether the State has 
met its burden of proving that a consent was voluntarily given: (1) There must be clear and 
positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently 
given'; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, the Court will] indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
9 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived." State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 467 {quoting 
State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990)( quoting United States v. Abbot. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977); see also United States 
iLMedlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988). 
a. Evans' Consent Was Not Freely and Intelligently Given. 
First, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evans' consent was freely and 
intelligently given, as it was given under the most chaotic and personally disturbing of 
circumstances. Secondly, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evan's consent was 
unequivocal and specific. On the contrary, Ms. Evans' consent was the very definition of 
equivocation. 
Ms. Evans was clearly not in the state of mind to give consent to search freely and 
intelligently, as the police officers found her in the middle of a personal crisis. At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Crapse testified he was called to the home of Ms. Evans on March 
25, 1999, as a Division of Child and Family Services caseworker went unannounced to the home 
of Julianne Evans to remove her newborn child from her (R. at p2,11.19-25). Officer Crapse and 
Officer DeRyke both noted in their testimony that Ms. Evans was obviously distraught and upset 
that her infant was being taken away from her. (R. at p. 19,1.6). Ms. Evans was hurriedly packing 
up baby formula and toys for the infant, and was receiving information from DCFS about visiting 
her child, and how her child would be provided for (R. at p.7). It is in the middle of this chaotic 
and disturbing time, that the officers repeatedly ask if they can search the home (R. at 94.7-11). 
As Ms. Evans explicitly states, she does not know how to respond to the 
10 
\ 
officers at that point in time (R. at p.7,11.9-10). She pauses in her packing, indicating her 
uncertainty, and her inability to process the information being requested by the officers. (R. at 
•p.7). 
b. Evans' Consent Was Not Unequivocal and Specific. 
Further, there is no clear and positive testimony that Ms. Evan's consent was unequivocal 
and specific. Instead, Ms. Evans' consent defines uncertainty and equivocation. At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Crapse testified there were a series of exchanges that took place 
between Ms. Evans and the officers. (R. at p.7,11.14). At first, Ms. Evans did not know what to 
say (R. at p.7,11.9-10). Ms. Evans then shakes her head no (R. at p.7,1.24). When the officers 
fail to obtain the response they want, they persist. Officer Crapse states that he is forced to 
clarify whether they may search or not, specifically because her answer is so indefinite. (R. at p.8, 
11.5-6). At no point did Ms. Evans make any indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers 
could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17). The officers asked whether that was "no she did not 
mind if they searched" or "no, they could not search." (R. at p.8,11.5-6). Also, Ms. Evans nodded 
or shook her head from side to side in response to another request to search (R. at p.8). After 
repeated requests to search the home, Officer Crapse finally promises Ms. Evans she would not 
go to jail that day (R. at p.9,11.13-15). From the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, it 
is clear that Ms. Evan's production of the alleged contraband and later consent to search were not 
unequivocal and specific. Were it so, the officers would not have had to continually request 
permission to search; the officers would not have been unsure about whether Ms. Evans was 
stating "no, she didn't mind if they searched" of "no, she did mind if they searched." Finally, if 
the consent was unequivocal and specific, the officers would not have had to make a promise to 
11 
Ms. Evans in exchange for permission to search. It requires the persistent requests of the 
officers, and the contributing of the comments of the DCFS worker for Ms. Evans to finally give i 
in. Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the officers take advantage of Ms. 
Evans when she is in a weakened state. Although Ms. Evans was involved in a traumatic 
i 
situation personally, having her newborn child removed from her, the officers show no 
compassion for those circumstances. Even when she denies them permission to search her home, 
they assert that such denial is equivocal, and for that reason, they were compelled to clarify. < 
Finally, had the consent to search been unequivocal and specific, the officers would not have had 
to bargain for permission to search. 
II. The State Cannot Prove that Ms. Evans9 Consent Was Given Without Duress or 
Coercion, Express or Implied. 
< 
"A consent that is the product of duress and coercion is not a consent at all." Harmon 
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). Because Ms. Evan's alleged consent was produced by the deceptive 
practices of the officers, all fruits of her invalid consent are properly suppressed. The issue of i 
whether a consent to search is voluntary depends upon 'the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances — both the characteristics of the [person consenting] and the details of police 
conduct." State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 
412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), accord Harmon, 910 P.2d at 
1206. Elements showing the absence of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of a claim of
 ( 
authority to search by the officers, 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, 3) a 
mere request to search, 4) cooperation by the defendant, and 5) the absence of deception or trick 
12 
on the part of the officer. State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 1980), as cited by State 
v. Archuleta 925 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah App. 1996). 
a. Officer Crapse Coerces Consent by Making a Claim of Authority. 
The officer's statement that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she produced 
contraband represents a claim of authority by the officers. Firstly, the two officers show up in 
full uniform, bearing firearms (R. at p. 15). DCFS and the officers are removing Ms. Evans' 
infant child from her care, an overwhelming display of the authority of the State (R. at p.2). 
Against this backdrop, Officer's Crapse represents that he has both the discretion and the 
authority to decide whether or not she will go to jail that day (R. at p. 10). His statement 
represents express coercion in that he indicated that Ms. Evans was somehow afoul of the law, 
and the threat of jail was imminent if she did not comply. His statement also implies that he had 
some reason to take Ms. Evans to jail at the time he made the statement. 
b. The Officers's Requests Exceed a "Mere Request" to Search 
In the instant case, the officers clearly exceed a mere request to search. The officers 
begin by asking if they can search. When the officers fail to obtain the response they want, they 
persist. At no point did Ms. Evans make any indication, verbal or nonverbal, that the officers 
could search her home. (R. at p.8,11.12-17). The officers attempt to "clarify" her negative 
response (R. at 94.8.5-6). Again, Ms. Evans nodded or shook her head from side to side in 
response to another request to search (R. at p.8). After repeated requests to search the home, 
Officer Crapse finally promises Ms. Evans she would not go to jail that day (R. at p.9,11.13-15). 
It requires the persistent requests of the officers, and the contributing of the comments of the 
DCFS worker for Ms. Evans to finally give in. 
13 
c. Officer Crapse Deceives Ms. Evans into Believing He Has the Authority and 
Cause to Arrest Her. 
The officer's statement that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she produced 
contraband also represents deception on the part of the officers inasmuch as the Officer readily 
admitted that, at the time he made the statement, he had no cause to take Ms. Evans to jail (R. at 
p.25,1.22). In fact, Officer Crapse had no authority to take Ms. Evans to jail until after the 
alleged controlled substance was produced. Ms. Evans gave consent simply because the Officer 
promised he would not take her to jail. However, at the time of the promise, Officer Crapse had 
no authority to make such a promise because there was no basis upon which to take Ms. Evans to 
jail at that time. Officer Crapse was there merely on a keep the peace call, and not on any < 
independent business of the police department (R. at p.2). Because of this, Officer Crapse clearly 
deceived Ms. Evans into thinking that he had the authority to take her to jail. 
CONCLUSION 
Taking advantage of one's emotional state cannot be tolerated when one's constitutional 
rights are involved. No person could be expected to make calm, rational decisions when one's
 ( 
newborn infant is removed, regardless of the circumstances leading to removal. The officers 
conceded that Ms. Evans seemed very upset and emotionally distraught throughout their 
exchange. The officers capitalized on Ms. Evans' fragile condition by further playing on her 
emotions. It is when Officer DeRyke makes a blatant appeal to her emotional state, saying, "y°u 
have drugs here and look what its doing, you're losing your family and it's ruining your life." 
that Ms. Evans finally begins to weaken, producing evidence against herself. Further, solid 
relations between police officers and the public require that officers not deceive the public into 
14 
< 
believing the officers possess an authority that they do not. Officer Crapse had no authority or 
ability to arrest Ms. Evans or take her to jail at that time. Thus, the promise by Officer Crapse 
that he would not take Ms. Evans to jail if she turned over the drugs falsely asserted that he 
possessed an authority which he did not. As such, his representation was coercive and amounted 
to deception or trick on the part of the officer. Viewed in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, the State cannot prove that Ms. Evans consent was freely and intelligently given, 
absent coercion or duress. For this reason, all evidence presented against Ms. Evans is properly 
suppressed. Accordingly, her appeal should be granted, and the First District Court's judgment 
overturned. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) 2* day of June, 2000. 
JUSTIN BOND 
Attorney for Appellant 
L^ 
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Addendum 1 
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910 P.2d 1196, State v. Harmon,
 w a h 1995) Pagel 
*1196 910 P.2d 1196 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Julie HARMON, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 930414. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 14, 1995. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1996. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., of 
possession of controlled substance, and she appealed 
from denial of motion to suppress evidence. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, 854 P.2d 1037. 
Certiorari was granted. 868 P.2d 95. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) arrest was valid, and 
(2) consent to search was voluntary. 
Affirmed. 
Durham, J., dissented and filed opinion in which 
Stewart, Associate C. J., joined. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 1134(3) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General 
1 lOkl 134(3) Questions considered in general. 
[See headnote text below] 
1. CRIMINAL LAW <®^ 1158(1) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings 
110kll58 In General 
HOkl 158(1) In general. 
Utah 1995. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews decision 
of Court of Appeals, not decision of trial court; in 
so doing, court adopts same standard of review used 
by Court of Appeals and reviews questions of law 
for correctness and trial court's factual findings for 
clear error. 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@=> 1134(3) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General 
1 lOkl 134(3) Questions considered in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Questions whether arrest was constitutional and 
whether consent to search was voluntary are 
questions of law reviewed for correctness. 
3. AUTOMOBILES <S=>349(4) 
48A 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(4) License or registration offenses. 
Utah 1995. 
Police had statutory and constitutional authority to 
effect full, custodial arrest of driver caught driving 
after her license was suspended, regardless of 
whether officer's subjective intent was to obtain 
consent to search driver's home for drugs. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14; 
U.C.A. 1953, 77-7-2. 
4. AUTOMOBILES <@=*349(10) 
48A —-
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(10) What is arrest; stop 
distinguished. 
Utah 1995. 
Term "arrest," as used in Motor Vehicle Act 
refers to detention or traffic stop rather than to 
formal, custodial arrest. U.C.A. 1953, 41-1-17 
(1991). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
5. AUTOMOBILES <§==>349(4) 
48A — 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(4) License or registration offenses. 
Utah 1995. 
Statute limiting police authority to arrest for 
misdemeanor traffic violations did not apply to arrest 
for driving with suspended license, inasmuch as 
statute by its terms applied only to Uniform Act 
Regulating Traffic on Highways, and driving after 
suspension was violation of a different statute. 
U.C.A. 1953, 41-6-166, 53-3-227; U.C.A. 1953, 
41-2-136 (1992). 
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6.AUTOMOBILES <§=>349(3) 
48A — 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(3) Offense in officer's presence, in 
general. 
Utah 1995. 
General statute governing arrest allows police 
officers, at their discretion, either to cite or to arrest 
for traffic offenses committed in their presence. 
U.C.A. 1953, 77-7-2. 
7. ARREST <®=>68(4) 
35 — 
3511 On Criminal Charges 
35k68 Mode of Making Arrest 
35k68(4) What: constitutes seizure. 
Utah 1995. 
Arrest of person is quintessentially a "seizure," 
required by Fourth Amendment to be reasonable. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
8. AUTOMOBILES <®==>349(4) 
48A — 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVII(B) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(4) License or registration offenses. 
Utah 1995. 
Custodial arrest for driving with suspended 
driver's license is "reasonable," within meaning of 
Fourth Amendment, in light of public safety 
concerns and fact that allowing unqualified driver to 
proceed on her way without valid license permits the 
unlawful activity to continue. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 4; U.C.A. 1953, 53-3-227; 
U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-136 (1992). 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
9. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <S=*23 
349 —-
3491 In General 
349k23 Fourth Amendment and 
reasonableness in general. 
Utah 1995. 
In defining scope of Fourth Amendment right, 
there is no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing need to search or seize 
against invasion which search or seizure entails. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
10. ARREST <@=*58 
35 — 
3511 On Criminal Charges 
35k58 Grounds and purpose in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Two primary governmental interests are served by 
taking suspect into custody: insuring that suspect 
will answer charges against him or her and 
preventing harm to the public. 
11. ARREST <®=>63.4(2) 
35 — 
3511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest 
Without Warrant 
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause 
35k63.4(2) What constitutes such cause in 
general. 
Utah 1995. 
Validity of arrest depends upon police officers' 
objective authority to arrest, as opposed to subjective 
motivations for arrest, and, therefore, otherwise 
valid arrest is not rendered unconstitutional by fact 
that officer may have had other motives for the 
arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
12. ARREST <®=>63.1 
35 — 
3511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest 
Without Warrant 
35k63.1 In general. 
Utah 1995. 
Rejection of pretext doctrine with regard to Fourth 
Amendment challenges to arrests extends to state 
constitutional challenges to arrests. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
13. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <&=> 181 
349 -— 
349V Waiver and Consent . 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl81 Particular concrete applications. 
Utah 1995. 
Defendant's consent to sesj.:h her home was 
voluntary, despite allegations that officer made false 
claims of authority to search and made show of force 
in order to obtain consent, where defendant 
continued to withhold consent to search in response 
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to those alleged actions, did not consent to search 
until some time later after being read her Miranda 
rights, and was friendly and cooperative during 
search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14. 
14. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=>180 
349 -— 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl80 Voluntary nature in general. 
Utah 1995. 
Whether consent to search is voluntary depends on 
totality of surrounding circumstances, including 
characteristics of accused and details of police 
conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 
1, § 14. 
15. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@^182 
349 — 
349V Waiver *1196 and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl82 Prior official misconduct; 
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit. 
Utah 1995. 
Consent to search that is product of duress and 
coercion is not "consent" at all. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
16. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>182 
349 — 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl82 Prior official misconduct; 
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit. 
Utah 1995. 
Factors indicating lack of duress or coercion in 
obtaining consent to search include absence of claim 
of authority to search by officers, absence of 
exhibition of force by officers, mere request to 
search, cooperation by owner of property to be 
searched, and absence of deception or trick on the 
part of the officer. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
17. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@^182 
349 -— 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl82 Prior official misconduct; 
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit. 
Utah 1995. 
Statement by police that they have valid search 
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warrant in hand, when, in fact, they do not, is 
"coercive" for purposes of determining whether 
consent to search was voluntary. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
18. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>182 
349 — 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl82 Prior official misconduct; 
misrepresentation, trick, or deceit. 
Utah 1995. 
It was deceptive, for purposes of determining 
whether defendant's consent to search was 
voluntary, for police officer to tell defendant that he 
"could" come back with a warrant when he, in fact, 
knew that he could not obtain a warrant. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
19. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <§=>184 
349 — 
349V Waiver and Consent 
349kl79 Validity of Consent 
349kl84 Custody, restraint, or detention 
issues. 
Utah 1995. 
Consent to search given while one is in custody is 
not, per se, involuntary; question is whether 
officers used coercive tactics or took unlawful 
advantage of the arrest in order to obtain consent to 
search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
*1197 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen. and J. Kevin 
Murphy, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Joan C. Watt, Mark R. Moffat, and Robert K. 
Heineman, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
HOWE, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision in this case. Siate v. Harmon, 854 
P.2d 1037 (Ct.App.), cert, granted, 868 P.2d 95 
(Utah 1993). Defendant Julie Harmon entered a 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, while reserving her 
*1198 right to appeal the trial court's denial of her 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The court of 
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appeals affirmed her conviction. Id. at 1041. 
I. FACTS 
On November 19, 1991, Detective Robert Russo, 
an eight-year deputy county sheriff assigned to the 
Metro Narcotics Task Force, received a tip from an 
informant that Harmon was distributing narcotics 
from her home in Magna. At approximately 6:00 
that evening, Russo went to her home to ask her for 
information confirming or rebutting the accusations. 
When he arrived, Harmon was in her car backing 
out of her driveway. Russo approached her, 
identified himself, told her about the tip, and asked 
if he could search her home. She denied the 
accusations and refused to allow the search, stating 
that she was on her way to visit her father, who had 
recently suffered a heart attack and was returning 
home from the hospital. 
Russo advised Harmon that if she refused to 
consent, he "could come back at a later time with a 
[search] warrant," which, he warned, was an 
"unpleasant experience." (FN1) She again declined 
to allow an immediate search. Russo testified that 
Harmon said she would allow him to search upon 
her return. However, Harmon testified that she told 
him that if he wanted to "hang around," she would 
talk to him when she returned. 
Harmon then drove to her parents' home. As she 
drove away, Russo called to check on Harmon's 
driver's license and was informed that it had been 
suspended. He decided he would arrest her for 
driving with a suspended driver's license ("driving 
on suspension"). Seeing Harmon drive by shortly 
thereafter, Russo called for an assisting officer in a 
marked patrol car, and together they stopped her in a 
parking lot two blocks from her home. Russo placed 
her under arrest for driving on suspension, and she 
was handcuffed by an assisting officer. The 
testimony differs at this point, (FN2) but both parties 
agree that Harmon informed Russo that he would 
need a warrant if he wanted to search her home. 
Russo searched her person incident to the arrest 
and found pills in a prescription vial with its label 
scratched off. (FN3) He also confiscated $285 
found in Harmon's purse. Russo placed her in his 
car, advised her of her Miranda rights, and 
proceeded to take her to the Salt Lake County jail. 
The other officers stayed behind to impound her car. 
Harmon testified that on the way to jail, Russo told 
her that he knew she had drugs in her home, that he 
would have to get a warrant, and that they would 
"tear my house apart." Russo did not recall making 
these statements. Harmon admitted to Russo that 
she had been afraid to let him into her home because 
at one time she had sold drugs and the home 
contained drug paraphernalia but that she was trying 
to clean up her act. She told him that if he drove her 
back to her home, she would sign a search consent 
form and let him in so that he could retrieve those 
items. Russo did not promise her any benefit for 
permitting a search of her home and told her that she 
would probably go to jail anyway. When Harmon 
again told Russo she would consent to the search of 
her home, Russo turned his car around, started back 
to her home, and called for assistance. On their 
arrival, Russo again advised her of her Miranda 
rights and read her a written consent form which she 
signed. Harmon's dog was in the home. Harmon 
indicated that the dog may try to bite the officers. 
Russo told her that he would have to shoot her dog if 
it attacked the officers. After some discussion, the 
officers permitted Harmon to go into the *1199 
home alone to take the dog out into the back yard. 
Russo and several back-up officers proceeded 
inside. Harmon, who was friendly and cooperative 
during the search, assisted the officers by pulling 
various items of drug paraphernalia and illegal drugs 
out from underneath a sofa in the living room. She 
was permitted to telephone her brother-who is a 
police officer-to seek advice. When the search 
concluded, Russo permitted Harmon to stay at her 
home with instructions to phone him the following 
morning. She was not cifd'd for driving on 
suspension but was later charged with possession of 
a controlled substance. 
Harmon moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
during the search of her home. The trial court 
denied the motion, and she subsequently entered a 
conditional guilty plea and was placed on probation 
for eighteen months. The court of appeals affirmed 
the denial of her motion to suppress, holding that 
Harmon's stop and arrest were not unconstitutional 
and that her consent to search her home was freely 
and voluntarily given. Harmon, 854 P.2d at 
1039-40. 
II. ANALYSIS 
[1] [2] We first clarify our standard of review. On 
certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n. 2 (Utah 
1992); see also Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 850 
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P.2d 1267, 1269 n. 4 (Utah 1993). In doing so, this 
court adopts the same standard of review used by the 
court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are 
reversed only if clearly erroneous. Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) 
; see also State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990). The issues presented in this case-whether 
Harmon's arrest was constitutional and whether her 
consent to search was voluntary—are questions of 
law that we review for correctness. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993). 
The trial court's underlying factual findings will not 
be set aside unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous. Id. 
A. Validity of Harmon's Arrest 
[3] Harmon contends that the court of appeals 
erred in holding that her arrest for driving on 
suspension did not violate the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution or article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
1. Statutory Authority to Arrest 
Initially, we observe the fundamental rule that 
courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if 
the case can be decided on other grounds. West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 
1994); Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. Thus, we 
begin by examining whether the arrest was valid 
under our state statutes. If it was not, then we need 
not go further. 
[4] When Harmon was arrested in November 
1991, Utah's Motor Vehicle Act provided: 
[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly 
authorized by the [motor vehicle] department or by 
law shall have the power and it shall be their duty: 
(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant for any violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions of this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or 
the use of the highways. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) (emphasis 
added). (FN4) The State argues that the "shall" 
wording of this statute made it presumptively, if not 
conclusively, Russo's duty to take Harmon into 
custody for driving on suspension. This 
interpretation of the statute is not persuasive. 
Obviously, it is not police policy and practice to 
arrest all traffic offenders- *1200 -in fact, almost 
the exact opposite is true. The statute, originally 
passed in 1935, used the word "arrest" to mean a 
seizure or detention, not a formal, custodial arrest. 
"An arrest is an actual restraint of the person 
arrested or submission to custody." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-1 (emphasis added). Under this definition, a 
traffic stop qualifies as an arrest because the alleged 
violator is not free to leave until he is satisfactorily 
identified and has signed a written promise to 
appear, even though the stop is a limited seizure 
more like an investigative detention than a custodial 
arrest. See State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 594 
(Utah Ct.App.1992); see atoUtah Code Ann. § 
41-6-167(d) (referring to "the arresting officer's" 
issuance of traffic citation to "the arrested person"). 
Thus, the proper interpretation of section 41-1-17 is 
that officers have the authority and duty to "arrest"--
meaning stop or seize-traffic offenders. The section 
does not authorize or require officers to take all 
traffic offenders into custody. (FN5) 
[5] Harmon asserts that police authority to arrest 
for a misdemeanor traffic violation, including 
driving on suspension, is limited by the following 
sections: 
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for 
misdemeanor-Setting Bond 
Whenever any person is arrested for any 
violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, 
the arrested person, for the purpose of setting 
bond, shall in the following cases, be taken 
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate 
within the county in which the offense charged is 
alleged to have been committed and who has 
jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most 
accessible with reference to the place where said 
arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an 
immediate appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge 
of driving or being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or combination thereof.... 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge 
of failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to 
property. 
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(4) In any other event when the person arrested 
refuses to give his written promise to appear in 
court as hereinafter provided, or when in the 
discretion of the arresting officer, a written 
promise to appear is insufficient. 
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-Contents-
Promise to comply-Signing-Release from 
custody.... 
(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a 
misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not] (FN6) 
immediately taken before a magistrate as 
hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall 
prepare in triplicate or more copies a written 
notice to appear in court containing the name and 
address of such person, the number, if any, of his 
operator's license, the registration number of his 
vehicle, the offense charged, and the time and 
place when and where such person shall appear in 
court. 
(d) The arrested person, in order to secure 
release as provided in this section, must give his 
written promise satisfactory to the arresting officer 
so to appear in court by signing at least one copy 
of the written notice prepared by the arresting 
officer. The officer shall deliver a copy of such 
notice to the person promising to appear. 
Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith release the 
person arrested from custody. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Harmon contends that under section 41-6-166, 
persons stopped for misdemeanor traffic *1201 
violations are to be arrested and arraigned in only 
four specific circumstances: (1) when requested by 
the suspect, (2) when arrested for DUI, (3) when 
arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the suspect 
refuses to sign the promise to appear contained in the 
citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the 
written promise to appear is insufficient. She argues 
that for all other misdemeanor traffic violations, 
officers have the authority to issue a citation only for 
a violation under section 41-6-167, after which they 
must release the suspect. 
We decline to address this argument because these 
sections do not apply to the violation for which 
Harmon was arrested. By their very terms, both 
sections apply only when a person is arrested for 
"any violation of this act." "This act" refers to the 
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, 
passed by the legislature in 1941. See 1941 Utah 
Laws 113-40. The act in its present form is now 
codified at title 41, chapter 6. Thus, the reference 
to "this act" should now properly be read "this 
chapter," meaning chapter 6. The driving on 
suspension statute upon which Harmon's arrest was 
based was not part of the original Uniform Act 
Regulating Traffic on Highways and is not part of 
title 41, chapter 6 of the current code. Rather, the 
statute was initially passed in 1933, see 1933 Utah 
Laws 82, and has been renumbered several times, 
most recendy at section 41-2-136 (Supp.1987) and 
section 53-3-227 (Supp.1993). If Harmon had been 
subject to a formal, custodial arrest for a violation 
under title 41, chapter 6, the interpretation of 
sections 41-6-166 and -167 would be squarely before 
us. Because these sections apply only to arrests for 
violations of title 41, chapter 6 of the Code, and we 
are not faced with an arrest under that chapter, these 
sections are not relevant to the issue before us. 
[6] Utah's general statute governing arrests 
provides, "A peace officer ... may, without warrant, 
arrest a person ... for any public offense committed 
or attempted in the presence of any peace officer...." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (emphasis added). 
However, "[a] peace officer, in lieu of taking a 
person into custody ... may issue and deliver a 
citation requiring any person subject to arrest or 
prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction charge 
to appear at ... court...." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-18 (emphasis added). Both of these statutes are 
couched in permissive language allowing police 
officers, at their discretion, to either cite or arrest 
for traffic offenses committed, in their presence. 
(FN7) In this case, Harmon drove on suspension in 
Detective Russo's presence and in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-136(2) (Supp.1990) (now codified 
at § 53-3-227(2)). We conclude that Russo was 
statutorily authorized to arrest Harmon for driving 
on suspension. 
2. Reasonableness of the Arrest Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
[7] Even though the arrest was permissible under 
statutory authority, Harmon contends her arrest still 
violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal 
constitution, which prohibits "unreasonable searches 
and seizures." The arrest of a person is " 
'quintessential^ a seizure,' " required by the Fourth 
Amendment to be reasonable. Pay ton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 63 
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v. 
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Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428, 96 S.Ct. 820, 830, 46 
L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
[8] Although the United States Supreme Court has 
not examined whether a custodial arrest for a traffic 
offense could be a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the issue did arise in a concurring 
opinion in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 
S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). In that case, 
Gustafson was pulled over for weaving across the 
center line. He could not produce a driver's license, 
and the officer placed him under arrest. The officer, 
in searching Gustafson, discovered marijuana. 
Gustafson conceded that the arrest was lawful, 
basing his appeal *1202 only upon the 
constitutionality of the subsequent search. Id. at 
262, 94 S.Ct. at 490. Justice Stewart began his 
concurrence by stating: 
It seems to me that a persuasive claim might be 
made in this case that the custodial arrest of the 
petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. But no such claim has been made. 
Instead, petitioner has fully conceded the 
constitutional validity of his custodial arrest. 
Id. at 266-67, 94 S.Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); see also Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420, 450 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2858 n. 11, 69 
L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Court has not imposed constitutional 
restrictions on authority to arrest for routine traffic 
stops), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 
L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 220-21, 94 S.Ct. 467, 470, 38 L.Ed.2d 
427 (1973) (defendant similarly conceded the legality 
of arrest for driving on suspension and for obtaining 
a permit by misrepresentation). The issue, at least 
regarding an arrest for driving on suspension, is now 
before us. 
[9] "In defining the scope of Fourth Amendment 
rights, 'there is "no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to 
search [or seize] against the invasion which the 
search [or seizure] entails." ' " State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 
1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)); see also 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at 
435-36 (1987) [hereinafter 2 LaFave]. In other 
words, "the permissibility of a particular law 
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 
660 (1979). We apply this balancing test to assess 
an officer's choice to arrest-rather than merely to 
detain and cite-a person for driving on suspension. 
The test permits consideration of a totality of 
circumstances, recognizing that a multitude of 
factors may influence an officer's discretion to 
arrest. 
[10] Two primary governmental interests are 
served by taking a suspect into custody: insuring 
that the suspect will answer the charges against him 
or her and preventing harm to the public. See Utah 
R.Crim.P. 6(b) (magistrate may issue summons in 
lieu of arrest warrant if it appears accused will 
appear and "there is no substantial danger of a 
breach of the peace, or injury to persons or 
property, or danger to the community"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-2(3)(a), (c) (authorizing arrest where 
officer has reasonable cause to believe person 
committed offense and person may "flee or conceal 
himself to avoid arrest" or "injure another person or 
damage property belonging to another person"); 2 
LaFave at 435 ("Arrest is justified when a person 
may flee from legal process, or where he may 
constitute a danger to the public if allowed to remain 
at large."). (FN8) Arrest of a suspect can enhance 
the state's interest in assuring appearance by 
allowing officers to establish the suspect's identity, 
investigate the suspect's ties to the community, and 
require a bond or other condition of release. Arrest 
of a suspect can also support the state's interest in 
protecting public safety by removing from the public 
those who present a danger to others. 
Nothing in the record indicates that Detective 
Russo's arrest of Harmon was motivated by the 
governmental interest of assuring her appearance at 
trial to answer the charge of driving on suspension. 
There was no question as to her identity. Her home 
was just a few blocks away, and her brother, a 
deputy sheriff, and her father, recovering from a 
heart attack, both lived in the area. The State admits 
that "given her community ties, *1203 Harmon was 
relatively unlikely to evade prosecution for driving 
under suspension." Indeed, the officers* actions 
best demonstrate that they did not consider her a 
flight risk: after they discovered drugs in her 
home~a much more serious offense than driving on 
suspension-they permitted her to stay at her home, 
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with instructions to phone Russo the following 
morning. 
Those who drive while on suspension, however, 
do present genuine public safety concerns. License 
suspension can result from any number of serious 
driving problems: convictions for automobile 
homicide, DUI, or reckless driving; mental or 
physical limitations; or driving or permitting the 
driving of an uninsured vehicle. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 41-2-127, -128 (Supp.1992) (now codified 
at §§ 53-3-220, -221). The State correctly asserts, 
"A driver whose license has been suspended should 
be presumed unfit to drive, owing to the problems 
that prompted the suspension." When that person 
continues to drive in deliberate violation of a legally 
binding order not to drive, the governmental interest 
in keeping the public safe is compromised. 
Physically removing the offender from the road 
helps achieve this interest by preventing the 
offender, at least for a time, from resuming the 
dangerous activity and by emphasizing to the 
offender the seriousness of the offense, thereby 
discouraging future violations. 
These governmental interests must be weighed 
against the intrusion that the arrest entails. 
A custodial arrest is a serious intrusion on a 
person's freedom and privacy. In a society in 
which freedom and independence are valued, 
arrest is the gravest of indignities. One arrested is 
not only no longer free to walk away, but also is 
suddenly in the control of another human being. If 
he resists, force will be used. A person arrested 
can no longer choose when he eats, with whom he 
associates, where or whether he will sit or stand, 
or even when he may go [to] the bathroom. 
Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the 
Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution 
to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic 
Offenses, 62 Temple L.Rev. 221, 263-64 (1989). In 
addition, any full custodial arrest, even for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation, allows an officer to 
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested 
person, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 477, 
and his or her vehicle, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981). 
We recognize that a number of factors weigh in 
favor of Harmon's argument that her arrest was 
unreasonable. First, she was arrested only blocks 
from her home to which she could have walked, 
arguably without any danger of future harm to the 
public. Second, driving on suspension is a class C 
misdemeanor, comparable to most other traffic 
offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-12(1) 
(violations of traffic rules and regulations are class C I 
misdemeanors unless otherwise provided). Finally, 
the officers apparently have few, if any, limits on 
their discretion to arrest since there are no statutory 
{see section II.A. 1. above) or administrative (we 
find none in the record) guidelines governing that 
decision. But see State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, < 
595-96 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (holding that officer 
abused his statutory discretion in arresting, at 
gunpoint, person who exceeded the speed limit by 
about twenty miles per hour). (FN9) 
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that \ 
Harmon's arrest for driving on suspension was not 
unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in 
removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public 
safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly 
held that driving on suspension is sufficiently serious 
to justify the offender's arrest rather than mere ^ 
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580 
So.2d 216, 217 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 
592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169 
Ill.App.3d 289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123, 129, 523 N.E.2d 
1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125 
Ill.Dec. 223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988), *1204 cert.
 ( 
denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 104 
L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 
642 A.2d 947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part 
because driving on suspension "poses grave danger 
to the public"); State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 633 
A.2d 1362, 1364 (1993); State v. Reding, 119
 { 
Wash.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992) 
(overruling prior contrary authority). (FN 10) 
Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a 
single case where an arrest for driving on suspension 
has been held to be unconstitutional. 
i 
This holding should be construed narrowly and 
does not necessarily apply to other traffic violations. 
"It should be the policy of every law enforcement 
agency to issue citations in lieu of arrest or 
continued custody to the maximum extent consistent 
with the effective enforcement of the law." 2 \ 
LaFave at 432 (citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to 
Pretrial Release § 2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968)); see 
also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult to 
imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine 
traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be 
justified."). As we stated in Lopez: ( 
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
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request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. 
However, once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use 
the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his 
way, without being subjected to further delay by 
police for additional questioning." 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (emphasis added) (quoting 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990)); see also United States v. Guzman, 
864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988). In this case, 
Harmon could not produce a valid driver's license or 
evidence of entitlement to use her vehicle. Her 
offense of driving on suspension is different from, 
for example, speeding, because allowing her to 
"proceed on her way" without a valid license permits 
the continuation of her unlawful activity. We 
conclude that her arrest was reasonable. 
3. Pretext Arrest Doctrine 
[11] Harmon argues that we should apply the 
"pretext doctrine" to her traffic arrest. The pretext 
doctrine focuses on whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the 
circumstances, would have undertaken the 
challenged Fourth Amendment activity. Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1134. In Lopez, we rejected the doctrine as 
applied to temporary stops for traffic violations. We 
concluded that settled "cause-to-stop" and "scope-of-
detention" rules adequately protect citizens from 
improper police stops for traffic violations. Id, at 
1135-36. We also explained that the doctrine 
erroneously focuses on the subjective, 
"unconstitutional motivation" of the detaining officer 
and discourages equal protection of the law. Id. at 
1136-40. We are now presented with the issue of 
whether a pretext analysis may still be applied to 
invalidate an arrest when it appears the arresting 
officer hoped to discover evidence of criminal 
activity other than that for which the arrest was 
made. 
In State v. Archuleta, this court addressed a pretext 
arrest argument. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 476, 126 L.Ed.2d 
427 (1993). There, a man arrested for violating his 
parole was also, at the time of his arrest, a murder 
suspect. Id. at 1237. In seeking to have his 
incriminating statements about the murder 
suppressed, he asserted that he was arrested for the 
sole purpose of gathering evidence against him on 
the murder charge rather than for the parole 
violation. We stated, "An arrest may not be used 
solely as a pretext to search for evidence of another 
crime." Id. at 1237-38 (citing United States v. 
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 
L.Ed. 877 (1932)). Although we suggested that an 
arrest could be unconstitutionally "pretextual," we 
upheld the arrest for the parole violation. We held: 
*1205 [I]f police have a valid right to arrest an 
individual for one crime, it does not matter if their 
subjective intent is in reality to collect information 
concerning another crime.... In other words, if 
the alleged pretext arrest could have taken place 
absent police suspicion of the defendant's 
involvement in another crime, then the arrest is 
lawful.... The arrest was not rendered invalid 
solely because the officers had a separate motive 
for arresting him.... 
Id. at 1238 (citing, among others, 1 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) (1987) 
[hereinafter 1 LaFave]). 
Unfortunately, the pretext issue was not squarely 
before the court in Archuleta because the officers 
had attempted to arrest the parolee for the parole 
violation even before they suspected him of 
involvement in the murder. Id. In other words, 
they "would" have arrested him even if he had not 
been a murder suspect. Nevertheless, the opinion 
indicates that where officers were justified in 
arresting a defendant for crime A-even if the 
defendant would not have been arrested but for his 
or her suspected involvement in crime B~the arrest 
for crime A would still be valid. 
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), we 
considered another pretext arrest argument. In that 
case, officers pulled over a car whose occupants 
were suspected in a recent theft. Id. at 934. The 
passenger in the car was arrested for giving false 
personal information to an officer. At the jail, 
officers conducted a search of the defendant and 
discovered cocaine. Id. The defendant contended 
that his arrest for giving false information was a 
pretext for the search. Id. at 941. We stated: 
"This contention is based on the assumption that the 
arrest was improper. Because we find that the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Pena [for giving 
false information], we do not consider his pretext 
argument." Id. (citing Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 
1237-38). As in Archuleta, we held that where 
officers were authorized to arrest a defendant for 
one crime, it did not matter that their subjective 
intent may have been to collect information 
concerning another crime. In fact, the court in Pena 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
910 P.2d 1196, State v. Harmon, ^iah 1995) Page 10 
refused to examine any consideration other than 
whether the arrest for the stated crime was proper. 
This is the position taken by the United States 
Supreme Court. In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 
128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, reh'g denied, 
438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150 
(1978), federal agents wiretapped a telephone which 
they believed was being used by drug dealers. The 
agents made no attempt to comply with a portion of 
the wiretap statute requiring that such activities be 
conducted so as to minimize their interceptions of 
nondrug-related conversations. The Court found 
that the agents' actions were reasonable under the 
circumstances and rejected a proposed examination 
of the agents' motives: 
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of 
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which 
provide the legal justification for the officer's 
action does not invalidate the action taken as long 
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
that action. 
Id. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 
L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)); see also United States v. 
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n. 3, 103 
S.Ct. 2573, 2577 n. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) 
(refusing to examine customs officers' motives when 
they were authorized to board ship); 1 LaFave § 
1.4(a), at 83 (supporting the above wording in Scott 
as "precisely what the rule ought to be"). 
Other courts have similarly held that the officers' 
objective authority to arrest, not their subjective 
motive, is the relevant inquiry. In People v. 
Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, 330 N.W.2d 405, 406 
(1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 917, 103 S.Ct. 1900, 
77 L.Ed.2d 288 (1983), a case with facts somewhat 
similar to those in this case, police officers arrested 
a suspected drug dealer for driving on suspension. 
The defendant asserted that his arrest was really a 
pretext to search his car. Id. at 407. The Michigan 
Supreme Court held: 
The fact that the police officers effectuated the 
arrest also realizing that they might find narcotics 
or other evidence of illegal activity is entirely 
irrelevant, unless police officers primarily 
concerned with enforcing *1206 certain laws are 
prohibited from enforcing other laws as well. We 
are aware of no such constitutional proscription. 
Id.; see also State v. Pickett, 126 Ariz. 173, 613 
P.2d 837, 838 (Ct.App.1980) (officer properly 
arrested person suspected of other crimes for 
drinking alcohol in public); Tray lor v. State, 458 
A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 1983) (officer properly 
arrested suspected drug dealer for driving on 
suspension); People v. Anderson, 169 Ill.App.3d 
289, 120 Ill.Dec. 123, 129, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 
(1988) (officer properly arrested murder suspect for 
driving on suspension). 
In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine, 
Harmon argues that her arrest was unconstitutional 
because even if she "could" have been arrested for 
driving on suspension, a reasonable officer in 
Detective Russo's position "would" not have done 
so. After considering our opinions in Lopez, 
Archuleta, and Pena, as well as cases from other 
jurisdictions, we conclude that the "pretext arrest" 
analysis should be rejected for many of the same 
reasons that we rejected the "pretext stop" analysis. 
The validity of an arrest must be analyzed on 
objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective 
motivations or suspicions. Inquiring into "what a 
reasonable officer would do" focuses on a question 
that is falsely objective, "fails to provide the 
consistency and predictability officers need," and 
ignores the possibility that usual police practice may 
be unconstitutional. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1138. 
Rather than debating the label or propriety of 
Detective Russo's motivations, we need only look at 
whether his arrest of Harmon for driving on 
suspension was reasonable under the balancing test 
in the previous section. If it was reasonable, it was 
constitutional. 
4. Reasonableness of the Arrest Under Article I, 
Section 14 
[12] Harmon argues that even if the arrest was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the 
federal constitution, the arrest was unreasonable 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
We disagree. The federally based balancing 
analysis, although admittedly imprecise, is 
straightforward, unburdened of unworkable 
"pretext" inquiries, and fundamentally sound. In 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1140, we concluded that 
"because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse 
to adopt it under article I, section 14 ... of the Utah 
Constitution." This holding also applies to pretext 
arrests. 
B. Consent to Search 
[13] Harmon contends that the court of appeals 
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erred in holding that her consent to search her home 
given to Detective Russo following her arrest was 
voluntary and not the fruit of an illegal arrest. 
Because we have concluded that Harmon's arrest for 
driving on suspension was valid, we need only 
examine whether her consent was voluntary. See 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. 
[14] [15] [16] Whether a consent is voluntary 
depends upon " 'the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances-both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of police conduct." Id. at 
1262-63 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689); see also 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218, 226, 93 
S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A "consent" 
that is the product of duress and coercion is not a 
consent at all. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 401 
(1991). Factors indicating a lack of duress or 
coercion include 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 
4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) 
the absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer. 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980); see also State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 8 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
In this case, the first and fifth factors are closely 
related so we will examine them together. Harmon 
asserts that Detective Russo made a false claim of 
authority to search, involving deception and trickery, 
by implying that he could get a warrant if she 
withheld her consent. At their initial confrontation, 
Russo advised Harmon that if she refused to consent 
to a search of her home, he "could come back at a 
later time with a [search] warrant," the execution of 
which he warned *1207 was an "unpleasant 
experience." Later, on the way to jail, Russo 
allegedly told her "he would have to" get a warrant. 
At the suppression hearing, Russo admitted that he 
knew he did not have sufficient evidence to obtain a 
warrant. (FN11) Yet Harmon testified, "He acted 
like he could run two blocks away and get it. That 
was my impression." 
[17] Clearly a statement by police that they have a 
valid search warrant in hand, when in fact they do 
not, is coercive. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 549-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 
797 (1968). Less clear, however, is the validity of a 
police threat to obtain a warrant if consent is 
withheld. According to the leading scholar of search 
and seizure issues, "[t]he only noticeable difference 
between a false claim that a warrant has been 
obtained and a false claim that a warrant mil be 
obtained is that the latter is less immediate...." 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(c), at 
187 (1987) [hereinafter 3 LaFave]; see also United 
States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495-98 (2d 
Cir.1974) (Newman, J., concurring). The claim is 
especially offensive when there is a clear lack of 
information to obtain a warrant. See State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268, 1274 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) 
("[A]ny indication by officers that issuance of a 
warrant was inevitable would vitiate an ensuing 
consent if probable cause was anything less than 
iron-clad."). 
[18] Russo's statement that "I could" come back 
with a warrant, while not as misleading as "I will" 
come back with a warrant, is still troubling. It 
implies full confidence that a warrant will issue. 
Even worse, the statement may cause a layperson to 
believe that the warrant will automatically issue, 
without any exercise of judicial power. Even though 
the trial court found that he "made no 
representations that he would most likely be granted 
a warrant," we conclude that Russo's representation 
that he "could come back" with a warrant, when in 
fact he knew he could not come back with a warrant 
absent more evidence, was deceptive. See Dotson v. 
Somen, 175 Conn. 614, 402 A.2d 790, 794 (1978) 
(police represented that they "could" get a warrant); 
State v. Mitchell 360 So.2d 189, 191 (La. 1978) 
(police represented that they could get a warrant "in 
twenty minutes"). (FN12) 
While Russo's statement is one factor indicating 
coercion, it does not, by itself, render Harmon's 
later consent involuntary. Importantly, Harmon 
refused her consent to the search following Russo's 
statement. She simply drove away. Russo's second 
alleged statement-that "he would have to" get a 
warrant as a result of Harmon's refusal to .allow the 
search-was accurate and not coercive. It is also 
significant that the trial court credited Russo's 
testimony that he "informed Harmon multiple times 
that he was not authorized to search her house 
without her consent" because he did not have a 
search warrant. The record confirms that Harmon 
always knew that Russo did not have a warrant and 
could not search absent her consent. 
[19] Harmon asserts that there was a clear 
exhibition of force when four officers participated in 
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arresting and searching her, confiscating her money, 
and searching and impounding her car. A consent 
given while one is in custody does not, per se, 
render the consent iavoluntary, but it is an important 
consideration. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 
411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) 
; Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1273. " 'The question is 
whether the officers used coercive tactics or took 
unlawful advantage of the arrest situation to obtain 
the consent.' " 3 LaFave § 8.2(b), at 182 (quoting 
United *1208 States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 
(5th Cir. 1973)). 
In assessing this question, we examine die 
characteristics of this arrest. Id. at 183. The arrest 
did not occur late at night, was not made at 
gunpoint, was not made by a forcible entry, and did 
not involve the use of force against Harmon. 
However, Harmon argues that Russo used the arrest 
as leverage to obtain consent to search, i.e., he 
would not take her to jail if she gave her consent. If 
true, this fact certainly would be a significant 
aggravating factor demonstrating lack of voluntary 
consent. See id. at 183 n. 48. However, the trial 
court specifically found that "Detective Russo did 
not promise Harmon any benefit for permitting a 
search of her house and stated that Harmon would 
probably go to jail" even if she consented to the 
search. Harmon does not mount an argument 
against that credibility assessment. We conclude 
that it is supported by the record and is not clearly 
erroneous. 
Although Harmon was placed in handcuffs upon 
her arrest, this apparently did not have any real 
impact upon her decision to consent since, at that 
time, she clearly refused to allow the search. Only 
later, after any "show of force" had dissipated, did 
Harmon agree to the search. Other cases involving 
far more extreme demonstrations or threats of force 
have resulted in holdings that consents or 
confessions were voluntarily given. See Thurman, 
846 P.2d at 1272-73; State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
464 (Utah 1988); State v. Hegelman, 111 P.2d 
1348, 1350 (Utah 1986). 
Harmon alleges that Russo made repeated 
"demands" to search her home. The record does not 
support this assertion. At their first confrontation, 
Harmon refused Russo's request to search and drove 
away. Harmon testified that after her arrest some 
time later, Russo again asked to search-an assertion 
that he denied. (FN13) Even assuming that 
Harmon's testimony is true, both parties agree that 
she again refused to allow a search at that time. 
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Only later in Russo's car, and not in response to any 
request, did Harmon state that she would allow a 
search. 
Harmon further asserts that her concern for her 
father's health made her more susceptible to consent 
because she did not want to cause him additional 
stress. Although her father was apparently 
recovering from a heart attack, he was no longer in 
the hospital and apparently somewhat active. When 
Harmon went to visit her father after refusing 
Russo's initial request to search, she discovered that 
he had gone elk hunting with a friend. Regardless of 
his condition, the trial court correctly reasoned that 
"it is not unusual for someone to be apprehensive 
that family members will be upset to learn of that 
person's arrest and pending criminal charges." We 
are not persuaded that Harmon's apprehension about 
her father prevented her from voluntarily consenting 
to the search. 
Other facts demonstrate that her consent was 
voluntary. The record indicates that Harmon, once 
past the indignation of her arrest, was friendly and 
cooperative. She twice offered her consent after 
being advised of her Miranda rights. Upon arriving 
at her home, Russo repeated the Miranda warnings 
and read to Harmon a written search consent form, 
which she then signed. "[I]t is the duty of an 
appellate court ... 'to examine the entire record and 
make an independent determination of the ultimate 
issue of voluntariness.' " Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464 n. 
76 (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 
341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) 
). Having examined the record here, we conclude 
that Harmon's consent to search her home was 
voluntary. 
We affirm the court of appeals' decision upholding 
Harmon's conviction. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and RUSSON, J., concur in 
Justice HOWE's opinion. 
DURHAM, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that 
"Harmon's arrest for driving on suspension was not 
unreasonable in light of the governmental interest of 
removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public 
safety reasons," while simultaneously concluding 
that "[n]othing in the record indicates that *1209. 
Russo's arrest of Harmon was motivated by the 
governmental interest of assuring her appearance at 
trial." Part of the rationale for the second 
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conclusion-that Harmon was eventually left at her 
home and not incarcerated—is, it seems to me, 
equally applicable to the first. In other words, there 
is nothing in the record to suggest that Harmon's 
arrest was motivated by the governmental interest in 
getting her off the road for public safety reasons. 
She was only a few blocks from her home; her car 
was parked off the roadway, and she was not driving 
it or threatening to drive it when arrested. This 
arrest appears to have been motivated solely by the 
desire of the arresting officer to intimidate Harmon 
into consenting to a search of her home and, more 
significantly, to have been unreasonable under these 
circumstances. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in Justice 
DURHAM'S dissenting opinion. 
FN1. At the suppression hearing, Russo admitted 
that he did not have sufficient information to obtain 
a warrant. 
FN2. Harmon testified that Russo again asked her to 
search her home and when she refused, he said, 
"Then, you are going to jail." According to 
Harmon, she then asked, "[I]f I let you search my 
house, then you [w]on't take me to jail?" 
whereupon Russo responded, "You're right." 
Russo denied asking to search following the arrest 
or making any of these statements. The trial court 
did not make any findings of fact regarding this 
testimony. 
FN3. The criminal charge based on the mislabelled 
prescription medication was dismissed following 
Harmon's preliminary hearing and is not 
challenged in this appeal. 
FN4. This statute has since been completely 
rewritten and is now found at Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-107 and § 41-3-105. These current statutes 
do not mention officers' arrest power for all 
vehicle-related violations as did section 41-1-17. 
But see § 41-3-105(8)(a) (1993) (officers "shall" 
arrest for violations of the Motor Vehicle Act, title 
41, chapter la, or the Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act, title 41, chapter 3). 
FN5. Our use of the word "arrest" throughout the 
remainder of this opinion refers to a full, custodial 
arrest. 
FN6. The word "not" was included in the original 
1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the 
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949 
Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that 
"the only logical reading of the statute is that it has 
application only when a citation is issued in lieu of 
an arrest and no appearance is made before a 
magistrate." Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d 1058, 
1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
statute should read "whenever a person is not 
immediately taken before a magistrate." 
FN7. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant 
of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment 
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for 
Traffic Offenses, 62 Temple L.Rev. 221, 250 n. 
188 (1989) [hereinafter Salken] (listing Utah 
among twenty-eight states that have no limitations 
on police discretion to arrest for a traffic offense). 
Many states have statutes that limit arrests for 
traffic offenses. Id. at 251 n. 189. 
FN8. Other governmental interests in arresting 
suspects may include obtaining evidence of the 
crime for which the suspect is accused, providing 
certain social service functions, and maintaining 
the proper respect for law and the police. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(3)(b); Salken, 62 
Temple L.Rev. at 266. 
FN9. See also Joanne R. Whiting, When Probable 
Cause is Constitutionally Suspect, 1991 
Wis.L.Rev. 345, 369-72; Arthur Mendelson, 
Arrest for Minor Traffic Offenses, 19 Crim.L.Bull. 
501, 510-12 (1983) (both encouraging statutory 
and administrative guidance to limit officer 
discretion to arrest for traffic violations). 
FN10. We note that in several Utah cases, arrests 
for driving on suspension were not challenged. 
See In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars, 
823 P.2d 468, 469 (Utah 1992); State v. Rice, 717 
P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986); State v. Pacheco, 712 
P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986); State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah Ct.App.1990), 
cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (1991); State v. Baird, 
763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
FN11. At the suppression hearing, Harmon's 
counsel asked Russo, "[B]ased on the information 
you had, you couldn't have gotten a search 
warrant, could you?" Counsel for the State 
objected to the question because the answer "calls 
for the officer to make a legal conclusion." The 
court initially sustained the objection but later 
permitted the question after Harmon's counsel 
clarified that Russo had applied for about forty 
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search warrants before this incident and was 
basing his testimony only upon his own 
experience. Russo admitted that he did not have 
enough information to obtain a warrant to search 
Harmon's home. 
*1209_ FN12. The court of appeals has wisely 
Page 14 
stated, "[0]fficers would be well advised to refrain 
from any commentary, direct or by implication, on 
the likelihood a warrant would actually issue." 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274 n. 7 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). 
FN 13. The trial court did not make any factual 
finding regarding this testimony. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Allen STERGER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900078-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 6, 1991. 
Defendant brought motions to suppress evidence 
consisting of controlled substances, drug 
paraphernalia and sample of defendant's blood which 
was obtained following automobile accident. The 
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don V. Tibbs, 
J., denied the motions. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) 
inventory search of defendant's automobile was 
authorized and legal, but (2) remand was required to 
allow for taking of findings of fact concerning issue of 
voluntary consent. 
Affirmed in part, remanded in part. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW @ >^ 1130(5) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(I) Briefs 
110kll30 In General 
11 Okl 130(5) Points and authorities. 
[See headnote text below] 
1. CRIMINAL LAW <©^=> 1178 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(R) Error Waived in Appellate Court 
110kll78 In general. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Court would not consider whether inventory search 
of defendant's vehicle violated Utah Constitution, 
where defendant failed to brief or argue state 
constitutional guarantees in either pretrial hearing or 
on appeal. 
2. CRIMINAL LAW <@^> 1158(4) 
110 — 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(O) Questions of Fact and Findings 
110kll58 In General 
1 lOkl 158(4) Reception of evidence. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Findings of fact supporting trial court's decision on 
motion to suppress are reviewed under clearly 
3. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=^ 66 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k66 Inventory and impoundment; time and 
place of search. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Failure to offer defendant opportunity to make 
arrangements for his car does not eliminate 
justification for conducting inventory of car, or render 
inventory illegal. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
4. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@ >^60.1 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k60.1 In general. 
Formerly 349k60 
Utah App. 1991. 
Deputy sheriff was justified in taking defendant's car 
into custody following accident, where front 
windshield of car was shattered, car was inoperable 
and blocking road in remote area, all of car's 
occupants had been taken for medical attention and 
there was no opportunity to ask defendant what he 
wanted done with car. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
5. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @^>58 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k58 Inventory or booking search. 
[See headnote text below] 
5. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®^66 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k66 Inventory and impoundment; time and 
place of search. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Inventory searches meet the need to protect 
individual property in police custody, protect police 
against claims of loss or theft of property, and detect 
dangerous conditions of instrumentality within 
impounded vehicles. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
6. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ®^>66 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
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349k66 Inventory and impoundment; time and 
place of search. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Police officer was authorized to examine and 
inventory contents of defendant's vehicle, where 
officer was authorized to take custody of defendant's 
vehicle after it was involved in accident and all of 
vehicle's occupants were taken for medical attention. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
7. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <@=^ 66 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k66 Inventory and impoundment; time and 
place of search. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Bifurcated inventory search of defendant's vehicle 
was legally justified, even though there was time lapse 
of at least one day between impounding of defendant's 
vehicle and time inventory was completed, where 
initial search was performed contemporaneously with 
impounding, and inventory was completed at later 
time because remoteness of area required deputy 
sheriff to prioritize his duties, which meant removing 
victims for medical care, getting defendant's blood 
drawn, and arresting and transporting defendant. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
8. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <3==>66 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k66 Inventory and impoundment; time and 
place of search. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Where there is initial search performed 
contemporaneously with impounding of vehicle, and 
second search conducted after vehicle has been 
impounded, both parts of search are legally justified. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
9. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ®^65 
349 — 
3491 In General 
349k60 Motor Vehicles 
349k65 Scope; trunk, compartments, 
containers, and luggage. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Deputy sheriff did not improperly selectively open 
containers in inventory search of defendant's vehicle; 
deputy testified he opened all closed containers in 
vehicle except sealed cans of food. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
10.SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <S=»194 
349 — 
349VI Judicial Review or Determination 
349kl92 Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
349kl94 Consent, and validity thereof. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Determination of whether defendant voluntarily 
consented to blood test could not rest simply on trial 
court's observation that defendant submitted to the 
test; State must meet its burden of proof on consent 
issue. 
11 .AUTOMOBILES <@^418 
48A 
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests 
48Ak417 Grounds for Test 
48Ak418 Consent, express or implied. 
Utah App. 1991. 
Implied consent statute was not applicable where 
defendant was not placed under arrest prior to his 
blood being drawn. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10, 
41-6-44.10(l)(a). 
*123 Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for 
defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and Dan R. 
Larsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's 
denial of two motions to suppress evidence consisting 
of controlled substances, drug paraphernalia and a 
sample of defendant's blood which was obtained 
following an automobile accident. 
Defendant seeks review of the following issues: (1) 
whether the inventory search of his automobile was 
authorized and legal under the existing circumstances; 
(2) and whether the sample of his blood was legally 
taken. We affirm as to the evidence obtained during 
the inventory search and remand as to the blood 
sample. 
FACTS 
On July 23, 1989, the vehicle in which defendant, 
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his wife and two passengers were riding, left the road 
and collided with an embankment. The accident took 
place in a remote area of eastern Garfield County, 
Utah. Defendant left the vehicle and went for help. 
A helicopter transported defendant's wife and the two 
passengers to a hospital in Page, Arizona. Prior to 
leaving the accident site, one of the passengers 
accused defendant of being drunk and causing the 
accident. The other passenger died en route to the 
hospital. Defendant, who appeared to be the least 
injured was transported to the Bullfrog Clinic, a 
nearby medical facility. 
Deputy Shawn Draper of Garfield County arrived 
shortly after the accident. After the passengers had 
been transported for medical attention, a tow truck 
arrived to remove the inoperative vehicle from the 
road. Because the vehicle was locked, Draper used a 
"slim jim" to force open one of the doors. Draper 
then inventoried the contents of the vehicle. During 
the inventory, Draper opened a camera case and 
found a film canister, which he also opened. He then 
seized a green leafy substance found inside the 
canister, believing it to be marijuana. After 
discontinuing the inventory, Draper had the vehicle 
towed to his home in Ticaboo, Utah, where he 
planned to continue the inventory. After the tow truck 
left the scene, Draper drove to the Bullfrog Clinic, 
where defendant had been transported, and called the 
Sheriff's office to determine how to proceed. Draper 
was instructed to have blood drawn from defendant. 
Draper told defendant he was required to submit to a 
blood test since he had been involved in an accident. 
Defendant was not told he could refuse, and he was 
not under arrest at this time. William Patrick Quinn, 
a certified park medic, summoned Peter Hollis, a 
physicians assistant employed by the Bullfrog Clinic, 
to take the *124 blood. Hollis explained to 
defendant that Draper wanted the blood taken, and 
proceeded to take the blood. After several 
unsuccessful attempts by Hollis, Quinn located a vein 
and started the catheterization. After defendant's 
blood was taken, Draper transported him to 
Koosharem, Utah, and placed him in the custody of 
another deputy. The test revealed that defendant's 
blood alcohol level was within the legal limit, but 
traces of THC, a marijuana by-product were present. 
The day following the accident, defendant's vehicle 
was towed from Draper's ho 
impound yard. Draper completed his inventory of the 
items in the vehicle two days after the accident. 
Draper testified that he opened all closed containers, 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 
except canned goods. In a Tupperware container, 
Draper found marijuana and drug paraphernalia. He 
seized these items. All of the items found in the 
vehicle were eventually listed on an inventory sheet 
by Draper. 
At his pretrial hearing, defendant moved to suppress 
the contents of the film canister, the contents of the 
Tupperware container, and the results of the blood 
test. Defendant alleged that these items were illegally 
seized. The trial court denied his motions and this 
appeal followed. 
[1] At the outset, this court must determine if 
defendant waived his state constitutional claims. The 
State asserts that the lower court had no such 
arguments before it and therefore the issue was 
decided only under the United States Constitution. 
We agree. This court has often urged counsel, most 
recently in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 
(Utah Ct.App.1990), to include more than a "nominal 
allusion" to state constitutional rights in appellate 
briefs and arguments. In the present case, defendant 
failed to brief or argue state constitutional guarantees 
at either the pretrial hearing or on appeal. 
Accordingly, we decline to consider his arguments 
based on the Utah Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2] Findings of fact supporting a trial court's 
decision on a motion to suppress are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah R.Civ.P. 
52(a). State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (citing State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
INVENTORY SEARCH 
[3] [4] Deputy Draper testified that he took custody 
of defendant's car, inventoried its contents, and had 
the car removed from the scene of the accident. 
Defendant first argues Draper did not have to 
impound the car but could have left it locked and 
where it was. This assertion is without merit. 
Defendant's car was partially blocking the road in a 
remote area where the accident occurred. The front 
windshield was shattered and the car inoperable. All 
of the occupants had been taken for medical attention 
and Draper had no opportunity to ask defendant what 
he wanted done with the car. (FN1) "[T]he existence 
or absence of justification for the impoundment of an 
automobile may be determined from the surrounding 
circumstances." State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 
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(Utah 1987) (citations omitted). Given the condition 
of defendant's car and where it was located after the 
accident, there was justification for taking the car into 
police custody. 
[5] [6] Before defendant's car was towed from the 
accident scene, Draper inventoried its contents. 
Inventory searches conducted under these 
circumstances are justified, Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 
U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 
(1973), and it is v/ell settled that such a search is an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); State v. 
Earl 716 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah *125 1986); State v. 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Inventory procedures meet three distinct needs: (1) to 
protect individual property in police custody; (2) 
protect police against claims of loss or theft of 
property; and (3) detect dangerous conditions of 
instrumentality within impounded vehicles. Johnson, 
745 P.2d at 454 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 
96 S.Ct. at 3097). Having determined that Draper 
was authorized to take custody of defendant's vehicle, 
a concomitant right existed to examine and inventory 
its contents. See State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 
444 P.2d 517 (1968). 
Our analysis does not stop at determining that the 
impoundment and inventory search of defendant's car 
were justified. We must also determine if the search 
was conducted for inventory purposes, in a legal 
manner, and not merely as a "fishing expedition for 
evidence." Defendant alleges that, even if an 
inventory search was authorized, it was illegal 
because it was not carried out pursuant to 
standardized procedures. (FN2) 
Bifurcated Inventory Searches 
[7] The Garfield County Sheriff's Department has 
written procedures governing when the contents of a 
vehicle shall be inventoried, and how that inventory 
shall be carried out: 
4.05 Vehicle Inventories 
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried. 
A written inventory shall be made of all contents of 
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked 
containers. The trunk and also any compartments 
shall be opened and the contents inventoried. AH 
evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in 
the evidence locker. Such record shall become a 
part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle 
changes from one person to another, the person 
taking custody of the vehicle shall also assume 
custody of the contents by placing his/her signature 
on the inventory list. 
These procedures are silent as to how soon after a 
vehicle is impounded the inventory must be 
completed, and whether bifurcated searches are 
permitted. 
The fourth amendment requires a sufficient 
proximity in time between the impoundment of a 
vehicle and the subsequent inventory search. Ex 
Parte Boyd, 542 So.2d 1276, 1279, cert, denied, 493 
U.S. 883, 110 S.Ct. 219, 107 L.Ed.2d 172 (1989). 
Each moment, hour or day that passes detracts from a 
full effectuation of the objectives of the inventory, 
namely to protect property. Id. (FN3) 
In the present case, there was a time lapse of at least 
one day between the impounding of defendant's 
vehicle and the time the inventory was completed. 
However, the inventory was initiated immediately 
after the accident. It was completed at a later time 
because, as Draper testified, the remoteness of the 
area required him to prioritize his duties, and that 
meant removing victims for medical care, getting 
defendant's blood drawn, arresting and transporting 
defendant, and completing the preliminary 
investigation of the accident. 
[8] We agree with defendant that a bifurcated 
inventory search, such as was conducted here, is not 
specifically provided for in the applicable procedures. 
That fact alone, however, does not make the inventory 
search illegal. Where there is an initial *126 search 
performed contemporaneously with the impounding of 
a vehicle, and a second search conducted after the 
vehicle has been impounded, both parts of the search 
are legally justified. Cf. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 
380, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 (1984) 
(upholding a second search conducted after vehicle 
was impounded); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 
259, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982) (upheld 
warrantless search even though prior inventory search 
had already been made); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 
805 (Utah 1986) (warrantless search after automobile 
impounded upheld). 
Closed Containers 
[9] Defendant also alleges that, contrary to the 
inventory search guidelines, Draper did not open all 
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closed containers found in the vehicle. The Garfield 
County Sheriff's guidelines specifically state that "A 
written inventory shall be made of all contents of 
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked 
containers." As to the opening and inventorying of 
closed containers, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated that standardized criteria, Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, 93 
L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), or established routine, Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 
2610-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), regulate the opening 
of containers found during an inventory search. See 
also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 
1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (absent specific policies, 
search not sufficiently regulated to satisfy fourth 
amendment); Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28 (state 
trooper's opening of a zipped bag during a warrantless 
inventory search was defective in absence of 
standardized police procedures mandating the opening 
of closed containers during such a search). 
We are not persuaded by defendant's argument. In 
Shamblin this court interpreted recent cases to 
establish "that the Fourth Amendment is violated 
when closed containers are opened during a vehicle 
inventory search in the absence of a standardized, 
specific procedure mandating their opening." 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28. (Emphasis added). 
"With a standardized, mandatory procedure, the 
minister's picnic basket and grandma's knitting bag 
are opened and inventoried right along with the 
biker's tool box and the gypsy's satchel." Id. at 428. 
Draper testified that he opened all closed containers 
except sealed cans of food found in defendant's 
vehicle. He did not arbitrarily or selectively open 
containers, as defendant would have us believe. 
Accordingly, defendant's reliance on Shamblin is 
misplaced. (FN4) In this case, not only did 
standardized procedures exist, but they were followed 
as well. 
Conclusion as to Inventory Search 
None of the arguments put forth by defendant as to 
the inventory search, persuade us that the evidence 
obtained during that search should have been 
suppressed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
found in his vehicle. 
BLOOD SAMPLE 
[10] Defendant next claims that the sample of his 
blood should be suppressed because it was drawn 
without his consent, and because the persons who 
drew the blood were not authorized to do so. We 
deferentially review the trial court's determination that 
defendant consented to the blood test, as is 
appropriate with all factual determinations. State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). (FN5) 
*127 Defendant contends that at no time did he 
voluntarily consent to the blood test. He claims he 
acquiesced because Draper told him he was required 
to submit to a blood test. The State acknowledges 
defendant was told that blood was required to be 
drawn because there had been an accident, and they 
do not dispute the inaccuracy of the statement. 
Nonetheless, they contend, and the trial court found, 
that defendant consented to the test twice: once after 
he was told by Draper that a sample was required, 
and again when the medical personnel present asked 
him to proceed with the sampling. 
The trial court found defendant consented simply 
because there was no dispute in the record that 
defendant submitted to the test. However, a 
determination of voluntary consent cannot rest on such 
a cursory observation. In sustaining its burden that 
voluntary consent was given the State must meet its 
burden of proof: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and 
"freely and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 
(quoting United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 
(10th Cir.1977)) (citations omitted). 
Our examination of the record reveals that the trial 
court failed to make adequate findings of fact 
concerning the issue of voluntary consent. The trial 
court did not make any findings as to the factors 
outlined above. The record is devoid, for example, of 
any discussion regarding whether defendant knew that 
he could refuse the test. Second, Draper told 
defendant such a test was required. Because factual 
issues are best addressed at the trial level, State v. 
Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), 
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we remand for a rehearing on this critical issue. 
[11] In an alternative argument, defendant contends 
that the blood test result should have been suppressed 
because the blood sample was taken by persons not 
authorized to draw blood pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44.10 (Supp.1990), the implied consent statute. 
The State responded to this argument in their brief, 
stating it was unnecessary to determine if Hollis and 
Quinn were authorized to draw blood, because 
defendant voluntarily consented to the blood test, 
making the implied consent statute inapplicable. We 
agree that § 41-6-44.10 is inapplicable to the facts at 
hand, but we find it inapplicable for the reason that 
defendant was not placed under arrest prior to his 
blood being drawn. (FN6) Because the implied 
consent statute *128. is not applicable in this case, 
defendant's claim fails. (FN7) 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of 
the inventory search of defendant's vehicle. As to the 
motion to suppress the results of the blood test, we 
remand for an examination of the voluntariness of 
defendant's consent. 
BENCH and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
FN1. In any case, failure to offer defendant an 
opportunity to make arrangements for his car does 
not eliminate the justification for conducting an 
inventory of that property, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), or 
render the inventory illegal. State v. Hygh, 111 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
FN2. Defendant states the following specific grounds 
of error: (1) the inventory procedures did not 
provide for bifurcated searches, (2) the procedure 
for opening closed containers was not followed, (3) 
the inventory sheet was not signed by the tow truck 
driver when he assumed custody of the vehicle, and 
(4) the procedures do not outline when the police are 
to impound a vehicle. Because defendant fails to 
cite support or provide any meaningful analysis as to 
arguments three and four, we decline to rule on 
them. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984). 
FN3. Searches with a time lapse between 
impoundment and the inventory have been upheld 
under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Rudd v. 
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State, 649 P.2d 791 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982) (eight-
hour lapse due to officer in charge of inventory 
being detained by complexity of accident in which 
subject vehicle was involved); Black v. State, 418 
So.2d 819 (Miss. 1982) (officers had to spend time 
on emergency detail). 
FN4. At any rate, a strict interpretation of the 
Shamblin language was tempered by the United 
States Supreme Court in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 
1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990): "A 
police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to 
determine whether a particular container should or 
should not be opened in light of the nature of the 
search and the characteristics of the container itself. 
The allowance of the exercise of judgment based on 
concerns related to the purposes of an inventory 
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
110 S.Ct. at 1635. 
FN5. We note that there is no bright-line test used 
when a reviewing court examines whether consent 
to a search was properly obtained. Rather, "the 
question of whether a consent to a search was in 
fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to 
be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
887 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 
2047-48, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). See also State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) ("trial 
court's finding of consent was clearly erroneous."); 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 
1980); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990); Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. Federal 
cases addressing voluntariness of consent to a 
search have also traditionally spoken in terms of 
voluntary consent as a fact question. See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 23, 105 S.Ct. 
409, 412, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (issue of consent a 
factual issue); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1878-79, 64 
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (voluntariness of consent is a 
question of fact); United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 
1141, 1153 (10th Cir.1986) (defendant's consent a 
factual finding); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 
832, 839 (8th Cir.1986) (consent reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard); United States v. 
Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir.1986) 
(voluntariness of consent a finding of fact); United 
States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 747 (1st Cir.1985) 
(question of consent is one of fact, not of law); 
United States v. Lopez, 111 F.2d 543 (10th 
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Cir.1985) (trial court's finding of fact on issue of 
voluntariness for consent cases must be accepted on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous); United States v. 
Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.1984) 
(standard of review for denial of motion to suppress 
is the clearly erroneous standard). 
*128_ FN6. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a) 
(Supp.1990) provides that a person operating a 
motor vehicle is considered to have consented to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine. 
This statute is applicable only to persons who have 
been placed under arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968) (implied consent statute 
only applicable to persons who have been placed 
under arrest); In the Interest of R.L.I., 111 P.2d 
1068 (Utah 1989) (blood sample taken from motorist 
who was not under arrest, who was not informed he 
could refuse to submit to the test, and who did not 
consent thereto, was taken contrary to provisions of 
implied consent statute and results therefore 
inadmissible); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988) (chemical test cannot be taken without 
driver's consent prior to arrest unless driver is 
unconscious or otherwise not able to give consent). 
FN7. Our counterpart in Oregon has addressed this 
issue on similar facts, and held that defects in 
administering such a test go to the weight to be 
given its results by the trier of fact, but do not make 
the results inadmissible. Gildroy v. Motor Vehicles 
Division, 100 Or.App. 538, 786 P.2d 757, 758 
(1990) (emphasis added). 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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James Crapse - D 
A. That's what we were informed of, yes. I believe at that 
time Officer Deryke asked -- let's see. (Pause.) Yes. He 
asked Ms. Evans if myself and he could take a look around 
the house. 
Q. The report says a quick look around the house. Is that 
your best recollection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then what was her response to that? 
A. Umm, she was gathering her stuff and said I don't know 
what to say to you. 
Q. All right. And then Officer Deryke's response to that? 
A. He quoted, does that mean that you have something here 
that you don't want us to find, end quote. 
Q. Did Ms. Evans make any response at all? 
A. No, she didn't. She just remained silent, still packing 
the stuff. 
Q. And then you took over at that point, I think, at least 
in terms of talking to her, is that correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And what did you ask her? 
A. I then asked her again if she would mind if we searched 
the residence. 
Q. And did she reply or make some sort of response? 
A. She shook her head no and then I asked her --
Q. She just shook her head, right? 
James Crapse - D 
Yeah. 
Q. She didn't say anything? 
A. (Witness shook his head.) 
Q. Okay. Go ahead. 
A. I then asked her is that no, you don't mind if we look 
around or, no, we can't look around. 
Q. So you were trying to clarify the issue at that point? 
A. This is correct. 
Q. And what did she do then, if anything? 
A. She still sat and contemplated as to what she should 
respond with. 
Q. So she didn't say anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't shake her head this time either? 
A. No. 
Q. No response? 
A. (Witness shook his head.) 
Q. Okay. And then you asked her again, I believe? 
A. Yeah. At that time, from past experiences, I felt that 
there was something in the residence that she didn't want v|£ 
to know about or to find. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So at that time I told her that if she were to give 
me - -
Q. Excuse me, James. Was there one other time you asked 
J an tes Ci apse D 
her again if you could look through the residence and one 
m o r e 1 1 m e s h e just d i d.i i' L i e t» [. > L J I I i J":'" 
A . Correct. 
Q Okay. And then you f inal ] y ti : Id 1 lei wl: lat ? 
A. I said, quote, I'] 1 tell you what, if you give me the 
drugs you have in the house I promise not tc take you t : 
jail today. 
Q i^*---.* And let me ask you a 1 i ttle bi t about that Wl lat 
were you thinking about the promise not to take her to jail 
today? 
A Okay- I explained to her that because of her situation, 
her child being taken away, that she was in such a 
dist r^ssed srarp , chat if she gave me the drugs right at 
that, time that 1 would not actually handcuff her and take 
her ili W M I ii I ii i i'|li! I h^n ."aid there. 
Q I no you mean you wouldn't arrest her for the drugs she 
gave y ::n i, :i s that wl lat yen i meant? 
I I : I didn* t say that. 
\ Jl I<E J : re r e yen i t:l :i :i i ik ing? 
I i a s t h i n k i n g I w o u l d n ' t t a k e h e r t o j a i l , p h y s i c a l l y 
ml' nf f h e r , |> i1 In i i hi HI^II t" h < | j*- I, i ih nn : a r and 
t a k e h e r t o y n J . T h a t ' s what J was t h i n k i n g . 
0'] ;:c ;; D:i ::i • r e s t he r fc r s Dmeth :i ng? 
Suppose she d:i dn ' t p r o d u c e any dr u g s , d i d you have any p l a n s 
t o a.i: i est: 1: ler f DI: ai ry tl :i i i ig a t t l ia J: pc d n t ? 
P a a p 9 
James Crapse - D 
A. No. 
Q. So you're talking about if she produces drugs --at 
least this is your thought process, that if she produces 
drugs then I'm not going to take her to jail for the drugs, 
is that what you meant? 
A. This is correct. 
Q. Okay. What you said is just what you've stated here, 
I'll tell you that if you give me the drugs you have in the 
house, I promise not to take you to jail, that's how it came 
out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And what was her response to that? 
A. She still doesn't respond as affirmative or negative. 
At that time I asked her to think where in the house she 
might store the drugs that she had been using in the past. 
And then Mr. Burgess stated, quote, it would be best for you 
to give this officer what drugs you have so when you get 
sent to take a urinalysis it will come back as negative, end 
quote. 
Q. Let me back up a minute. Maybe I'm reading the report 
wrong or there's something in your notes that I don't 
understand. I'm reading this. "I finally stated to Ms. 
Evans, I'll tell you what, if you give me the drugs you have 
in the house I promise not to take you to jail today"? 
A. This is correct. I'm sorry. I didn't see that line. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOjgTHfiDfiR9 PH "99 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIANNE EVANS, 
Defendant 
HON. THOMAS L. WILLMORE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 991100182 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. Plaintiff has 
responded and a hearing was held before the Court on August 10, 1999. 
The issue before the Court is whether defendant's consent to search her home was voluntary. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether a consent is voluntary depends upon "the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." State 
v. Harmon. 910 P. 2d 1196,1206 (Utah 1995). The United States Supreme Court has held that if a consent 
is the product of duress and coercion, it is not a consent at all. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth factors 
indicating a lack of duress or coercion which are as follows: 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 
(2) the absence of an exhibit of force by the officers; 
(3) a mere request to search; 
(4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 
(5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
State v. Harmon. 910 P. 2d 1196. 1206 
The facts as testified to, by Officers James Crapse and Michael Deryke, at the Suppression 
hearing are as follows: 
(1) Officer James Crapse stated he was present at defendant's home on March 25,1999 at the 
request of an agent of the Department of Family Services, who was present to remove defendant's newborn 
child from her home because the child had tested positive for unlawful drugs. 
(2) Officer Crapse observed the defendant and Mr. Burgess from DFS discussing the infant and 
why the infant was being removed. The infant was with defendant and she was gathering infant items. The 
defendant was cooperating and did not appear at that time to be under the influence of any alcohol or illegal 
substances. 
(3) Officer Crapse asked defendant to be allowed to take a quick look around the house for 
illegal drugs. The defendant responded by indicating she did not know what to say to the officer. Officer 
Crapse asked her if that meant she had something to hide from the officer. Officer Crapse testified that 
defendant did not respond to that question. 
(4) Officer Crapse then testified the defendant shook her head in a negative way and the officer 
^ V~) 
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attempted to clarify whether defendant did not mind if the police officers looked around or that she did not 
want the police officers to look around. The defendant did not respond to Officer Crapse's question. 
• (5) Officer Crapse then told the defendant that if she gave him the illegal drugs in the house 
he would not take her to jail today and arrest her today, 
(6; i ne defendant did not respond further until additional assurances had been made by the 
officers that they would not take the defendant to jail that day. The defendant then told the officers that she 
did not remember where she put the drags. 
(7) Mr. Burgess told the defendant to turn 'the illegal drugs over to the police, The defendant 
walked to her purse and pulled out a yellow case which contained a small baggie of methamphetamine, a 
brown vile and a glass pipe. 
(8) Officer Michael DeRyke was present during i i 
tc ndant and his testimony is essentially the same. 
(9) Defendant was subsequently furnished a Permission To Search form which was marked and 
admitted as State's Exhibit 1, The Permission To Search was filled out by Officer Crapse. Defendant read 
and signed the Permission To Search and a search of defendant's residence was then conducted, which 
located other illegal drugs.. 
The Court must apply the facts as testified to at the hearing to the factors as set forth in the 
Harmon case to determine whether defendant's consent is voluntary. The first factor centers on an absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the officers. In this case, there was no claim of authority to search by 
the officers. No evidence has been presented to the Court that Officer Crapse and Officer Deryke claimed 
any authority whatsoever to search defendant's house. The officers simply asked the defendant for 
permission to search 
Concerning the second factor, which is an absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, no 
evidence has been presented to the Court showing any exhibition offeree by the officers to search or to 
force a consent search. The only evidence presented at the hearing were requests made by the officers to 
search, The officers did not use coercive tactics and did not take unlawful advantage of an arrest situation 
to obtain defendant's consent, In fact, defendant was never arrested by the officers once 'the drugs were 
turned over. She received a summons and information filed at a later date 
'I he tii.Ii d factor is whether the officers made "a mere request to search."' Defendant argues that 
because the officers requested to search numerous times, that renders the consent involuntary. Both officers 
testified at the hearing that defendant's answers to the questions were unclear and that is why she was asked 
numerous times whether the officers could search her home. The Court finds that because her answers were 
unclear, the officers were entitled to ask further questions to clarify her responses. Her answers centered 
on she did not know what to say and she shook her head in the negative to compound questions. Even 
though the officers requested to search moi e than once, theii repeated requests were proper given the 
responses of the defendant. 
In reviewing the fourth factor of whether the defendant cooperated in the search, the officers 
were present because defendant's baby was being taken into custody by Department of Family Services 
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because the infant had tested positive for illegal substances. The officers testified that there was discussion 
with the defendant concerning illegal drugs and the fact that they were destroying her life and her family. 
The defendant nodded her head in the affirmative to this fact. After the officers had talked to her and told 
her they would not take her to jail if she gave the drugs to them, the defendant walked over to her purse and 
pulled out a yellow case containing illegal drugs and paraphernalia, which was given to the officers. The 
defendant cooperated with the officers. The defendant further cooperated with the officers by reviewing 
and signing a Permission To Search, which allowed the officers to search defendant's residence. This factor 
strongly shows the consent was voluntary, given the surrounding circumstances. 
The final factor to be reviewed is whether there was any deception or trick on the part of the 
officer in obtaining defendant's consent. Defendant argues that the promise by Officer Crapse that he 
would not take the defendant to jail if she turned over the drugs is coercive or amounts to deception or trick 
on the part of the officer. In this case, Officer Crapse testified that he promised to not take the defendant 
to jail "today" and he was not going to arrest the defendant at that time if she turned over the illegal drugs 
she had in her possession. Officer Crapse did not say, "I'm taking you to jail, unless you will give me the 
drugs." On the contrary, Officer Crapse's statement was quite the opposite, "If you give me the drugs, I 
will not take you to jail today or arrest you today." Officer Crapse had no authority or ability to arrest her 
or take her to jail at that time. Furthermore, he did not use any deception or trick to obtain defendant's 
consent. The Court finds that the promise made by the officers was not deceptive or coercive. 
Also, when these facts are reviewed with the fact that defendant's baby was being removed 
from her home because the baby tested positive for an illegal drug, there was clearly no deception or trick 
on the part of the officer. In fact, the officer did not arrest the defendant or take her to jail that day when 
the illegal drugs were furnished to the officers. 
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, as presented to the Court at the Suppression 
hearing, the Court finds that defendant's presentation to the officers of the yellow case containing illegal 
substances and a glass pipe was voluntary and that defendant's consent to search her residence was 
voluntary. Therefore, the Court denies defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
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